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In our ASSC20 symposium, “Does unconscious perception really
exist?”, the four of us asked some difficult questions about the
purported phenomenon of unconscious perception, disagreeing
on a number of points. This disagreement reflected the objec-
tive of the symposium: not only to come together to discuss a
single topic of keen interest to the ASSC community, but to do
so in a way that would fairly and comprehensively represent
the heterogeneity of ideas, opinions, and evidence that exists
concerning this contentious topic. The crux of this controversy
rests in no small part on disagreement about what is meant by
the terms of the debate and how to determine empirically
whether a state is unconscious or not.
These are issues that directly concern all of us who study
consciousness, so it seems it would be in our best interest to
strive for consensus. Given the conversation at ASSC20, we
are pleased to have the opportunity to address some of the
nuanced topics that arose more formally, and share some of
the thinking we have done since the meeting. To reflect the
heterogeneity of ideas and opinions surrounding this topic,
we have organized this discussion into four distinct
contributions.
—M.A.K.P. and I.P.
Practical and theoretical considerations in
seeking the neural correlates of consciousness
Megan A. K. Peters
Psychology Department, University of California, Los Angeles, Los
Angeles, CA 90095, USA. E-mail: meganakpeters@ucla.edu
As empirical scientists studying consciousness, we should be
concerned with one question above all others: How can we de-
sign an experiment that will isolate the “conscious” processing
of something from the “unconscious” processing of it, so that
we can study the neural processing that underlies awareness –
the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) – without inad-
vertently including a number of other confounds? This is the
foundation of the scientific method.
Of course, this has always been the goal of studies seeking
the NCCs, for example via comparing brain activity in “con-
scious” and “unconscious” conditions (Baars 1993). But a num-
ber of confounds continue to plague our experiments. My goal
here, therefore, is to briefly enumerate the current practical
concerns in experiments seeking to identify the NCCs, and to
discuss how a newly developed paradigm can directly address
these practical issues (Peters and Lau 2015).
Isolating Awareness: Stimulus Strength and
Performance Confounds
Two pervasive and closely related potential confounds in the
scientific study of consciousness are stimulus signal strength
and task performance capacity (Lau 2008; Aru et al. 2012). Each
of these needs to be controlled for if we want to isolate aware-
ness to look for its neural correlates.
Controlling the external signal strength of a stimulus is rela-
tively easy, by designing an experiment in which stimulus prop-
erties do not vary across “conscious” versus “unconscious”
conditions. This means the “conscious” condition should not pre-
sent a large, bright, leisurely stimulus, while the “unconscious”
condition uses a small, dim, brief stimulus. Of course neural pro-
cessing would differ between these two conditions, but the
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difference would likely have relatively little to do with awareness
per se: every region of the visual processing system would likely
seem to play some critical role, all the way down to retinal gan-
glion cells (or even the computer screen!).
Although not as obvious as the external signal strength case,
an experiment producing unmatched task performance capac-
ity between “conscious” and “unconscious” conditions might
imply an internal signal strength difference – especially when
one engages in post-hoc data splitting into “seen” versus “un-
seen” trials (Shanks 2016). As an overly simplified example,
imagine a perceptual decision-making experiment in which all
stimuli are identical, but the observer blinks on some trials. On
“blink” trials the observer does not see the stimulus, and so in-
dicates “unseen” and performs at chance; on “no-blink” trials
the observer indicates “seen” and performs well. By post-hoc
splitting the trials into “seen” and “unseen” an experimenter
has essentially reduced her experiment to the bright versus dim
stimulus case, and again has not isolated awareness from the
confound of signal strength. Although overly simplified, this ex-
ample demonstrates the potential for erroneous conclusions if
performance is not matched between “conscious” and “uncon-
scious” conditions.
Stringent Definitions: What Should Count as
“Unconscious” and “Perception”?
Assuming we can successfully isolate awareness from signal
strength and performance, we must next operationally define un-
conscious versus conscious perception in an experimental setting.
First, let us address “unconscious”: for a stimulus to be un-
conscious, an observer’s subjective experience of the stimulus
should be no different from the subjective experience of nothing
at all. Although one could define being unconscious of a stimu-
lus in other ways, this conservative definition seems closest to
what is targeted when researchers want to distinguish a “con-
scious” condition or stimulus from an “unconscious” one.
A potential objection is that this definition might be too
conservative because it fails to capture an important aspect of
visual awareness: visual qualia. (For non-visual stimuli, qualia
in other modalities should be substituted in this argument.)
One might argue that an observer could have an amodal sense
or “hunch” that something is present, indicating a lack of true
visual awareness of the stimulus. However, this argument
requires further definition of just how visual is visual enough to
count as visual awareness. Should Type 2 blindsight count, in
which some patients with visual cortex damage have residual
visual awareness that lacks the usual “particularity, transpar-
ency and fine-grainedness” of visual experience (Brogaard 2015,
92; Foley 2015; Foley and Kentridge 2015)?
This objection brings up another more important question,
however: are visual qualia necessary to study the NCCs of sub-
jective awareness? I would argue no. Whether a subjective ex-
perience is visual or not should only affect experiments seeking
to identify the neural correlates of visual qualia, not those seek-
ing to uncover the neural correlates of subjective awareness it-
self. So, in experiments seeking the NCCs we should adopt this
definition: awareness of a stimulus is present if the subjective
experience of that stimulus is different from the subjective ex-
perience of the stimulus’ absence.
To define “perception”, I again favor a conservative defini-
tion that also will allow us to satisfy the requirement about
matched performance. To demonstrate that perception has in-
deed occurred in a perceptual decision-making task, an ob-
server must be able to make some identification or direct
discrimination decision about a stimulus better than just guess-
ing (Green and Swets 1966; Macmillan and Creelman 2004).
Of course, this narrow definition of perception excludes
other cognitive processing that may be argued to count as per-
ception, such as priming. A number of studies claim to evince
unconscious perception by showing that an unconscious prime
(color, word, picture, or even cross-modal event) can influence
behavior on a subsequent task (Kouider and Dupoux 2001;
Naccache and Dehaene 2001; Kouider et al. 2007; Nakamura et al.
2007; Faivre et al. 2014; Norman et al. 2014). Unconscious primes
may also influence objective performance in discriminating a
later stimulus without affecting subjective evaluations of that
stimulus (Vlassova et al. 2014).
However, in priming tasks the unconscious prime does not
meet our stringent definition of having been perceived: many
studies require that discrimination or detection of the prime be
at chance performance for the prime to be considered uncon-
scious (e.g., Kouider et al. 2007; Norman et al. 2014). (Of course,
demonstrating true chance performance is a statistical problem
in its own right.) Other studies do not ask for any objective or
subjective assessment of the prime at all, merely assuming it is
unconscious because it has been masked (e.g., Kouider and
Dupoux 2001; Naccache and Dehaene 2001; Nakamura et al.
2007). So, while studying unconscious priming can certainly
provide insight into visual processing, it does not meet the
stringent criteria of “perception” required to isolate awareness
from task performance or signal strength.
Fortunately, once we have matched stimulus strength and per-
formance, we will have created conditions in which “perception”
by this definition is identical as well. Now, the only thing that
changes between the two conditions of “conscious” and “uncon-
scious” is awareness of the stimulus – the “subjective awareness”
(Giles et al. 2016) – meaning that we have successfully isolated
consciousness while controlling for other confounding factors.
Exhaustive Measurement: The Criterion Problem
We have but one more obstacle to overcome in order to properly
design these experiments: the “criterion problem” (Eriksen 1960;
Merikle et al. 2001; Hannula et al. 2005). Just because an observer
reports he did not see a stimulus or has low confidence does
not mean he had zero subjective experience of it, only that his
experience fell below some (potentially very) arbitrary threshold
for reporting “seen” or “high confidence”. Unfortunately, all ex-
periments that ask participants to rate stimulus visibility or
confidence in a decision on any scale (Ramsøy and Overgaard
2004; Sandberg et al. 2010) are potentially prey to this problem,
and until now paradigms developed to avoid the problem (Kolb
and Braun 1995; Kunimoto et al. 2001) have met with replicabil-
ity issues (Morgan et al. 1997; Robichaud and Stelmach 2003) or
revealed other theoretical challenges (Galvin et al. 2003; Evans
and Azzopardi 2007; Maniscalco and Lau 2012). Although crite-
rion effects can reveal important psychological phenomena in
other areas of study (Witt et al. 2015; Peters et al. 2016), in the
study of consciousness they represent a very real and funda-
mental problem by preventing us from exhaustively measuring
the presence or absence of awareness (Reingold and Merikle
1988, 1990). Yet these types of scales continue to be used almost
exclusively in research seeking the NCCs.
Last year, Hakwan Lau and I designed a new paradigm
(Peters and Lau 2015) to exhaustively measure awareness in the
hopes of demonstrating that it should be possible to achieve
“conscious” and “unconscious” conditions that would allow for
matched performance. Our task modified the recent
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reapplication (Barthelme´ and Mamassian 2009; de Gardelle and
Mamassian 2014) of the classic criterion-free two-interval
forced-choice behavioral paradigm (Green and Swets 1966;
Macmillan and Creelman 2004). On each trial, only one of two
intervals contained a masked, low-contrast target to be discrim-
inated, but we asked subjects to discriminate targets in both in-
tervals (even though there was actually a target in only one)
and to bet on which interval they thought they had discrimi-
nated correctly. If subjects could discriminate the target when it
was present but could not bet on their choices, this would dem-
onstrate the kind of unconscious perception that would allow
for matched performance across “unconscious” and “conscious”
conditions in subsequent experiments (Peters and Lau 2015).
But we found no evidence for unconscious perception.
Instead, as soon as participants could discriminate the masked
target above chance (i.e., they perceived it) they could tell which
interval contained the target (i.e., they were conscious of it);
that is, if they were unconscious of the target, they demon-
strated no perception (Peters and Lau 2015). A follow-up study
asked participants to report which interval contained the more
“visible” target, thereby directly asking about visual qualia
rather than an amodal subjective sense of “something versus
nothing”. However, the results were nearly identical (Peters and
Lau 2015). Although it may be argued that the stimulus manipu-
lations necessary for producing unconscious perception can be
challenging and fickle, we measured the entire psychometric
function and still were unable to identify any point at which the
masked stimulus could produce above-chance performance but
fail to rise into awareness.
What This Means for the Scientific Study of
Consciousness
Do these results mean that we can never achieve matched perfor-
mance in “conscious” versus “unconscious” conditions, rendering
the requirements for experiments seeking NCCs impossible to
meet? Not necessarily. All we can infer from these results, for
now, is that unconscious perception of the type we require seems
to be harder to induce than the field may have realized. (We ha-
ven’t yet tried all the possible masking or neuromodulation tech-
niques in existence.) Nevertheless, these experimental findings
should make us think critically about what has actually been
found in studies that do not control for task performance, may be
susceptible to the criterion problem, or use masking or other ma-
nipulations to render a stimulus “unconscious”.
The first step toward seeking the NCCs must be for the field
to agree on the requirements for experimentally isolating
awareness and measuring it exhaustively: tasks in which “con-
scious” and “unconscious” conditions are performance-
matched, and which do not depend on arbitrary reporting crite-
ria. Then, we can work to produce an accurate taxonomy of
which techniques may produce such matched conscious/un-
conscious perception, and only then can we use the successful
techniques in experiments seeking the NCCs.
Of course, this requires that unconscious perception be
achievable in the first place. Most of us in the field do believe the
unconscious version of perception exists, but many of us don’t
believe it has been convincingly demonstrated (Peters and Lau
2015). Despite philosophical objections to the very concept of un-
conscious perception (Phillips, this commentary), we all need to
be convinced we are looking for something that exists – and how
to identify it – if we are to use it in experiments that aim to un-
cover the neural computations, representations, and structures
that give rise to our subjective experiences of the world.
Sensation and unconscious perception
Robert W. Kentridge
Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, UK.
E-mail: robert.kentridge@durham.ac.uk
Much has been written about the terms “perception” and “sen-
sation”. Whether either or both might occur unconsciously de-
pends critically upon definitions. If the definition of perception
includes a proviso that it is, or gives rise to, experience, it is
clear that no empirical evidence will ever show that perception
can occur without experience. I therefore want to use as simple
an “experience-neutral” definition of perception as is possible. I
start with the Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson and Weiner
1989). In the OED the most succinct neutral definition of percep-
tion is: “The process of becoming aware of physical objects, phe-
nomena, etc., through the senses”. What we perceive are
objects in the world (rather than events in our retina) and the
process of perception is separate from that of sensation. I will
adopt a working definition of visual perception simply as the
process through which we become acquainted with the visual
properties of objects in the world (i.e., their distal properties).
The OED also has a straightforward definition of sensation:
“. . .the subjective element in any operation of one of the senses,
a physical ‘feeling’ considered apart from the resulting ‘percep-
tion’ of an object”. So we might define visual sensation as the
subjective experience one sometimes has when a stimulus acts
on the visual system. In terms of these definitions the question
of whether unconscious perception is possible boils down to
testing whether representations of the distal stimulus can be
constructed when the stimulus being represented does not
elicit any sensation. Together with my colleagues I recently
published a report of an experiment that addressed this
question.
Estimation of Distal Stimulus Properties without
Awareness: Unconscious Perception?
There is much more to color perception than the activation of
cones in the retina. Our color experience depends on complex
cortical processes that appear to be involved in constructing an
estimate of the properties of the distal stimulus – what is
known as color constancy (see e.g., Smithson 2005). Having
color constancy means that we are able to judge that two identi-
cal material samples are the same color even when we see
them under different kinds of illumination. As the two samples
reflect light in identical ways, but are illuminated by lights with
different variations in power across wavelength, the light re-
flected from them to our eyes will differ. With sufficient visual
context from the surroundings we nevertheless judge the color
of the materials as the same. We can, however, also make judg-
ments not about the color of materials in the world, but instead
about our experiences of color. If we see two samples of a mate-
rial, one in shade and one in sunlight, we will judge that the
materials are the same but we can also say that the color we ex-
perience when we look at the material in the shade is duller
than the color-experience when looking at the one in direct
sunlight. Our percepts of the colors of the objects can be the
same even when we judge the sensations they elicit to be differ-
ent. The question we addressed in Norman et al. (2014) was
whether the process of estimating surface color depended upon
having color sensations: Was it possible to have color constancy
for an unseen surface?
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In our study we used meta-contrast masking to render
stimuli invisible. In meta-contrast masking the stimulus, in
our case a colored disc, is presented very briefly followed after
a short interval by a ring whose inner edge coincides with the
location that had been the outer edge of the disc. This arrange-
ment can render the disc quite invisible. It can still, however,
be shown that the color of the unseen disc is processed by the
visual system if we ask observers to make a decision about the
color of the ring, which might be green on some trials and blue
on others. If the disc matches the ring in color then observers’
decisions are speeded even when they did not see the disc. A
non-conscious estimate of the color of the disc is clearly
influencing behavior. What is the nature of that non-conscious
estimate? Is it low-level like the signal generated in the retina
or is it something more complex like an estimate of an object’s
surface reflectance? We test this by presenting the disc and
ring in a rich color context (against a background of many dif-
ferently colored squares) and changing the apparent illumina-
tion of the scene between presentation of the disc and
presentation of the ring. It appears as if a shadow is moving
rapidly across the display during a trial so that the disc is seen
under sunlight but, by the time the ring appears, it is in
shadow. The color of the disc is the same on all trials. There
are two colors of rings, constructed so that one matches the
disc in terms of the light it reflects to the observer’s eyes (a
spectral match) whereas the other matches in the disc in terms
of their apparent surface reflectance across the illuminant
change from sunlight to shadow (a surface match). We also se-
lected these colors so that one of the rings is generally classi-
fied as “blue” (the spectral match) and the other “green” (the
surface match). We compare reaction times for discrimination
of the ring’s color in trials with discs compared to trials with-
out discs and ask whether the spectral-match discs or the
surface-match discs are the more effective color primes,
that is, speed reaction time more. We found (somewhat to our
surprise) that the surface-match disc reliably speeds reaction
time more than the spectral-match prime. This remained the
case in a number of control experiments. Moreover, in a
follow-up phase conducted after the reaction time experi-
ments, observers were unable to guess whether trials con-
tained a disc or not (sensitivity measured as d’ was not
different from zero), and certainly could not see the discs. We
concluded that color constancy, that is, computation of surface
color, did not depend upon color experience. Is it reasonable to
take this further and conclude that color perception can be un-
conscious and so perception does not have to follow from
sensation?
According to my working definitions, in our experiment the
distal property of the disc was represented even though observers
could not detect its presence and so the disc was perceived despite
being unseen. Is there any reason to doubt this conclusion? The
main argument leveled against it revolves around whether per-
ception must be something done by a person, as opposed, say, to
a subsystem of the visual system. This is one of Tyler Burge’s
(2010) stipulations for perception. He says (I summarize) that per-
ception must be sensory, that its content must be of entities in the
outside world, that it requires perceptual constancy, and finally,
that it must be by the individual insofar as it can initiate or di-
rectly guide action by the individual. There is little doubt that the
disc in our experiment satisfies the first three stipulations but
what about the last? The answer depends upon how the disc
speeded reactions; on how this type of “priming” works.
How Different Are Seen and Unseen Primes?
Ansorge et al. (2014) recently comprehensively reviewed re-
search on mechanisms of masked priming and their relation-
ship with conscious executive control. One of the longest
standing models of masked priming is Neumann’s (1990) Direct
Parameter Specification (DPS) model. Neumann suggests that
primes activate a motor response in line with a pre-existing
“task-set” (relations between stimuli and the actions to be made
in response to them). This task-set can override more reflexive
responses to the prime (e.g., using the left hand to respond to
stimuli on the left). In DPS the prime may be contributing to
construction of a representation matching that of the target in-
termediate between the raw sensory input and the motor out-
put. It cannot simply be due to summation between the prime
and the target at an early sensory stage (e.g., at the receptor
level) stage – if it was then the spectral prime should be more ef-
fective than the surface prime rather than vice versa. So, in DPS,
“a masked prime that is akin to an action trigger sets off the re-
sponse that is specified in the task-control representation, al-
though the prime can remain below the threshold of
awareness” (Ansorge et al. 2014, 272). DPS is almost certainly be-
hind a large fraction of our priming effects and so, in this sense,
they are actions, made by the individual, and initiated in re-
sponse to the prime. Schubert et al. (2013) report unseen primes
also affecting temporal attention, speeding responses to events
following them closely in time. This may explain why even
spectral primes speeded responses to some extent in our study.
If a distal representation of the unseen stimulus in our study is
initiating action by the individual, then, even going beyond my
simple definition of perception, it still seems that perception
(including invocation of action by an individual) can be uncon-
scious and does not have to follow from sensation.
The action elicited by the unseen prime in our study and in
others reviewed in Ansorge et al. (2014) appears to be automatic
– there is no evidence that it is under voluntary control. One in-
terpretation of Burge’s stipulation that perception is done by
the individual, insofar as it initiates or guides action, is that
these actions must be under conscious voluntary control. One
might argue that this is slipping in a requirement equivalent to
“perception must be conscious” through the back door (to con-
sciously control something must one inevitably be conscious of
the relevant properties of that thing?). Instead, let us ask
whether the processing of masked primes is significantly differ-
ent to that of seen primes. What can unseen primes control?
Unseen primes can do much more than elicit motor responses.
They can modulate switching between “task-sets” (e.g., Lau and
Passingham 2007), they can slow or completely inhibit re-
sponses by priming “no-go” signals (e.g., van Gaal et al. 2009)
and even modify task goals in masked semantic priming (e.g.,
Fitzsimons and Bargh 2003). Of course, the masked primes in
these studies are not testably representations of a distal stimu-
lus. Nevertheless, the range of processes that can be controlled
by these unseen primes is not any different from those control-
lable by seen primes. Ansorge et al. (2014) conclude the key dif-
ference between conscious and unconscious primes is not in
what they can do but in their flexibility. Unseen primes control
responses by selecting from a limited set of alternatives that
have previously been set by the individual. Seen stimuli allow
novel responses to be executed and new task plans to be set up
(even here, unconscious stimuli can play a dominant role in ar-
riving at new task plans, e.g., Reuss et al. 2014). If unseen primes
can be used to modify not only just motor responses to stimuli,
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but also so many other aspects of our cognitions about a task is
it necessary to also require that these responses also be under
conscious voluntary control to qualify as percepts of an individ-
ual? Unseen primes can control not just one subsystem used in
tackling a task but, apparently, all relevant subsystems, albeit in
a less flexible but “fast and maybe more error-resistant”
(Ansorge et al. 2011, 282) way than seen primes. The ability to
use unseen primes in controlling so many diverse aspects of a
task suggests that they are available to the individual insofar as
the manner of their use is determined by the individual and
their processing benefits the individual. The results of our color
constancy study satisfy all of Burge’s criteria, and primes de-
fined by surface color might, in principle, be used to control all
of these other processes (of course, we don’t know, more experi-
ments are required). I am tempted to draw a conclusion that if it
walks like a duck and quacks like a duck then it is a duck – that
unseen primes can be perceived and so that color perception
can be unconscious and so perception does not have to follow
from sensation.
What we need to think about when we think
about unconscious perception
Ian Phillips
St. Anne’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6HS, UK.
E-mail: ian.phillips@st-annes.ox.ac.uk
Theoretical discussions of unconscious perception typically fo-
cus on how consciousness should be operationally defined (Lau
2008; Seth et al. 2008; Irvine 2013). However, a compelling case of
unconscious perception requires both evidence that conscious-
ness is absent and that perception is present. Consequently,
theorists must also consider how perception should be opera-
tionally defined, and assess alleged cases of unconscious per-
ception accordingly.
Traditionally, it was assumed that to be perceived a stimulus
must contribute to a subject’s conscious perspective (Moore
1925). To allow for the possibility of unconscious perception,
Kanwisher suggests instead using “perception” to refer to “the
extraction and/or representation of perceptual information
from a stimulus, without any assumption that such information
is necessarily experienced consciously” (2001, 90). Kanwisher’s
proposal needs refinement. It risks counting distinctive allergic
reactions as instances of perception (Dretske 2006). It also fails
to secure the idea that perception is an individual-level phe-
nomenon, not merely an occurrence in an individual’s visual
system or brain (Burge 2010, 368 ff.).
By way of refinement, Burge proposes that perception is con-
stitutively a matter of objective sensory representation by the
individual. This means that perceptual states do not merely
carry information but represent features of the physical envi-
ronment as opposed to “idiosyncratic, proximal or subjective
features of the individual” (2010, 397). According to Burge, such
contents are attributable just when perceptual constancies are
exercised. “Perception requires perceptual constancies.” (399).
An alternative approach focuses on the “role”, as opposed to
“content”, of perceptual states. Thus, Dretske (2006) proposes
that the information which perceptual states carry must be di-
rectly available for the control and guidance of action. Similarly,
Prinz (2015) stipulates that perception involves the transduction
of “useable” sensory information. Content and role approaches
are not exclusive. Milner and Goodale understand perception to
“refer to a process which [subserves] . . . the recognition and
identification of [external] objects and events and their spatial
and temporal relations” (1995/2006, 2). Here both content and
role requirements are in play.
In line with contemporary orthodoxy, all the authors just
mentioned claim that perception howsoever defined occurs un-
consciously. [See also Block (2016) and Block in Block and
Phillips (2016).] Here, I discuss four cases commonly invoked in
support of this contention. Thinking about whether perception
is genuinely present in these cases demonstrates that matters
are much less clear cut than standardly supposed.
Case 1: Blindsight
According to Burge, “blindsight patients perceive environmental
conditions. The perception involves perceptual constancies –
including motion, location, and size constancies. The percep-
tion guides action. There is strong reason to believe that some
of these patients lack phenomenal consciousness in the rele-
vant perceptions.” (2010, 374) In short: blindsight constitutes
genuine perception without consciousness. It is important to
consider the possibility that blindsight in fact involves abnor-
mal and degraded, but nonetheless conscious, vision (Phillips
2016). However, my current interest is in the importance of ask-
ing whether residual function constitutes genuine perception.
For Burge, a positive answer requires the preservation of visual
constancies. Yet constancy preservation in blindsight is far
from uncontroversial. Patient DB perceives neither surface color
nor chromatic contrast, matching colored stimuli purely on the
basis of wavelength (Kentridge et al. 2007; Alexander and Cowey
2013). Motion detection in GY is limited to “objectless” first-
order motion energy (i.e., spatiotemporal changes in luminance)
as opposed to changes in position or shape (Azzopardi and Hock
2011). And MS and GY’s capacities to locate and detect objects
are arguably limited to the detection of sharp luminance con-
tours and stimulus transients, “‘events’ varying ‘in subjective
salience’” not objective environmental features (Alexander and
Cowey 2010, 532). Assuming with Burge that constancies are
necessary for perception, such findings suggest that the rele-
vant preserved capacities of these patients at least do not con-
stitute perception. (See also Case 4 regarding “action-
blindsight”.)
Case 2: Subliminal Priming
Using a novel metacontrast masking paradigm (Fig. 1), Norman
et al. (2014) demonstrate preferential facilitation of color identi-
fication responses to a target preceded by an undetectable
prime matched in surface color when compared with one
matched in reflected color (i.e., wavelength).
This suggests that color constancy can occur outside con-
sciousness. Does it evince unconscious “perception”? That turns
on how the prime facilitates responding. One possibility is that
the prime elicits activity in the visual system, including surface
color representations, such that the visual system processes
subsequent surface-congruent stimuli more fluently. It is con-
sistent with this understanding that information concerning
the prime’s surface color is confined to the visual system and so
wholly unavailable for action control and guidance. Consider a
crude analogy: we do not perceive everything that causes pupil-
lary dilation, yet such dilation makes various subsequent stim-
uli easier to perceive.
Another possibility is that the prime automatically activates
associated responses in the motor system (Schmidt et al. 2006).
However, such response priming also does not demonstrate
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that the relevant information is available for individual-level ac-
tion control and guidance. Indeed, evidence suggests that com-
parable unconscious primes are not available for central,
executive control of action (Kunde et al. 2003; Ansorge et al. 2011;
cf. the “radically uncontrollable” effects in Snodgrass and
Shevrin 2006; Cressman et al. 2013). These concerns have wide
scope. They threaten the relevance of much work on subliminal
priming to the question of unconscious perception, at least if
we adopt a robust role-requirement on genuine perception.
Case 3: Unconscious Attention
There is now compelling evidence that spatial, feature-based
and object-based attention can all operate outside of awareness
(e.g., Kentridge et al. 1999, 2004; Schmidt and Schmidt 2010;
Norman et al. 2015). However, treated as evidence of uncon-
scious perception, such results merit much the same critique as
priming studies: it is one thing for a stimulus to elicit (even
widespread) activity in the subject’s brain which (perhaps dra-
matically) affects subsequent visuomotor processing; it is an-
other thing for a representation of that stimulus to be available
for voluntary, individual-level control and guidance of action.
Burge claims that attention itself “is a type of psychological
agency” and “[h]ence . . . attributable to the individual” (372; see
also Block in Phillips and Block 2016). But, in the present con-
text, attention refers to the stimulus-driven modulation of
visuomotor processing. Why should we think of the agent
themselves as doing this any more than we should think of the
agent as dilating their pupils?
Case 4: Vision-for-Action
Superficially the strongest case for unconscious perception in
the robust senses here in focus, looks to work on so-called vi-
sion-for-action representations associated with the dorsal
stream, and in particular to studies of patients with visual form
agnosia (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006) and so-called “action-
blindsight” (Danckert and Rossetti 2005; Whitwell et al. 2011).
Such patients fail to reveal evidence of size constancy in their
explicit, for example, manual or verbal, reports. However, their
accurate scaling of grasp aperture in visually guided grasping
provides evidence that (vergence based) size-constancy is pre-
served (Marotta et al. 1997; Sperandio et al. 2012; see also Mon-
Williams et al. 2001; Servos 2006). However, it is far from obvious
that vision-for-action constitutes genuine perception. [As ever
issues about residual awareness also need pressing. See, for in-
stance Whitwell et al. who write of their patient, SJ: “It is impor-
tant to note, however, [that her] failure to show a target
redundancy effect in our experiment does not mean that she is
completely incapable of detecting targets in her blind field (us-
ing a button press). Had we used a forced-choice variant of this
task she may have very well exhibited better-than-chance lev-
els of performance.” (2011, 915).] Indeed, although Milner and
Goodale do think perception can occur unconsciously, they in-
sist that “[t]he visual information used by the dorsal stream for
programming and on-line control . . . is not perceptual in na-
ture” (2008, 776; cf. 1995/2006, 2).
From the present perspective, a concern is whether the per-
tinent modulations of behavior (e.g., grasp aperture) witness
genuine control and guidance “by the individual”, and so meet
relevant role requirements for perception. An alternative pic-
ture is suggested by the familiar metaphors of an automatic pi-
lot (Pisella et al. 2000), tele-assisted semi-autonomous robot
(Goodale and Humphrey 1998, §9; Goodale and Milner, 2004, 98–
101; Milner and Goodale 1995/2006, §8.2.3), or heat-seeking mis-
sile (Campbell, 2002, 56). Such metaphors suggest that the only
representations attributable to the individual will be those asso-
ciated with target and action-type selection (cf. Clark 2007, 576).
Representations exclusively involved in fine-grained motor pro-
gramming will not be individually attributable. Indeed,
Figure 1. Trial sequence from Norman et al. (2014)
Notes: From left to right: a spatial cue and a brief delay precede the presentation of a prime for 0 (prime absent), 12.5, or 37.5 ms; a variable delay
follows, after which a change in the display’s illumination boundary occurs. This alters the illumination of the region in which prime and tar-
get (mask) are presented. Finally, a target (mask) is displayed. This is either green or blue and, given the previous change in illumination, re-
spectively, matches the prime in either “reflected” or surface color. The subject then identifies the color of the target as rapidly as possible.
Source: Reproduced with permission. CopyrightVC 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
6 | Peters et al.
Danckert and Rossetti note how, as with unconscious priming
discussed above, the parietal system “often functions automati-
cally, rapidly modifying visually guided hand movements . . . in
contradiction to conscious commands” (2005, 1042, see also
Pisella et al. 2000).
Conclusion
Proponents of unconscious perception face the challenge of pro-
viding an adequately justified operational definition of
individual-level perception. Assessed in the light of extant pro-
posals, many apparently clear cases of unconscious perception
no longer appear so clear cut. Moreover, an obvious concern
lurks in wait. One possible operational test for perception
(closely associated with Dretske’s role-based proposal above) re-
quires that the information carried by a perceptual state must
be exploitable by a subject to make a discriminatory response.
Yet this test for perception is equivalent to so-called “objective”
measures of consciousness (i.e., above chance discriminative
sensitivity) (Green and Swets 1966). As a result, no putative
cases of unconscious perception can hope to avoid the familiar
concern that they simply involve weak conscious awareness
unreported due to a conservative response criterion (Eriksen
1960; Holender 1986; Phillips 2016; Peters, this symposium).
Unconscious perception within conscious
perception
Ned Block
Department of Philosophy, New York University, 5 Washington Place,
New York, NY 10003, USA. E-mail: ned.block@nyu.edu
The debate on unconscious perception – including much of my
own contribution – has been misdirected (Peters and Lau 2015;
Block 2016; Block and Phillips 2016). The debate has focused on
the efficacy of methods designed to shave off the conscious part
of a perception, leaving unconscious perception. Can it be
done? I think the answer is yes, but the issue is not straightfor-
ward. Whether or not it can be done, and whether or not the re-
sulting unconscious percept would have to be different from
the unconscious part it resulted from, unconscious perception
is ubiquitous since many (if not all) conscious perceptions have
unconscious perceptions within them.
I will start by explaining how we can distinguish conscious
from unconscious representations in the visual system. Then I
will move to the issue of whether the difference between these
conscious and unconscious representations is the same as the
difference between personal and sub-personal representations.
I am discussing this latter issue because of the issue of whether
unconscious visual representation is always sub-personal and
hence not genuine perception (Block and Phillips 2016).
How can we distinguish between conscious and unconscious
visual representation? One useful approach is to focus on neu-
ral bases. Every conscious visual perception in an animal has a
neural basis and within that neural basis there is a neural basis
of unconscious visual representation.
If the viewer is far enough away from Fig. 2 so that the
stripes of the left and middle discs of Fig. 2 subtend one-fiftieth
of a degree or less, all three discs will look the same (see Fig. 3).
But He and MacLeod (2001) (see also Smallman et al. 1996)
showed that some gratings that cannot be resolved consciously
nonetheless are visually represented. The lense of the eye blurs
very fine gratings but they were able to project similar grids di-
rectly to the retina through the side of the eye, bypassing the
lense, by using laser interferometry, showing that gratings that
are not consciously seen produce after-effects of the same mag-
nitude as gratings that are consciously seen, and revealing that
both gratings are indeed represented in the visual system, in-
cluding in the retina and early vision.
An analogous result obtains for color flicker. If two colors al-
ternate at frequencies above 10 Hz (10 cycles per second), “het-
erochromatic flicker fusion” occurs: viewers consciously see a
single fused color rather than flickering colors (so long as the
two colors have the same luminance). For example, red and
green flickering above 10 Hz looks non-flickering and yellow.
(Combining red and green lights – an “additive” mixture, as is
used in your computer screen – produces yellow.) However,
retinal cells respond to flicker way above the frequency that
the subject can consciously see – as high as 40 Hz, and a way
station between the retina and the cortex (the lateral genicu-
late nucleus) responds to frequencies that are almost as high.
In the first cortical visual area, V1 (and probably to a lesser
degree V2), all cells responded to 15 Hz flicker and most to
30 Hz flicker (Gur and Snodderly 1997). In sum, the retina and
early vision registers flicker that the subject does not
consciously see as flicker.
How do we know these representations in early vision are
unconscious? Subjects show no sign of awareness of them and
are at chance in guessing. For example, Haynes and Rees (2005)
were able to predict the orientations that subjects were seeing
from activity in V1 at a greater than chance level even when
subjects were at chance in choosing which orientation they
saw.
But are these unconscious flicker and orientation contents
really contents of perception or are they just sub-personal rep-
resentations of information on a par with representations in the
brain of autonomic nervous system properties like heart rate or
representations in neurons in the gastrointestinal tract? First,
the unconscious representations have many of the same
Figure 2. These circles look different to you but if you move further away from the screen or page to the extent that the distance from the begin-
ning of one black bar to the beginning of another in the grid subtends one-fiftieth or less of a degree of visual angle they will look the same.
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contents as conscious representations. For example, both con-
scious and unconscious representations can have contents of
flicker under 10 Hz and orientation of grids under 50 cycles/de-
gree. Further, these representations are alike in many respects –
for example with regard to perceptual aftereffects and percep-
tual constancies. Constancies are important to what counts as
perception (Burge 2010).
There is strong evidence that size constancy is registered in
V1 independently of feedback from higher areas and good evi-
dence that lightness and color constancy is registered in V1 and
V2 also independently of feedback (MacEvoy and Paradiso 2001;
Hurlburt 2003; Pooresmaeli et al. 2013).
While there are clear cases of sub-personal representations
(such as gastrointestinal representations) and personal repre-
sentations (e.g., conscious perceptions), many if not most cases
of interest are indeterminate and there is no accepted charac-
terization of the difference. Every proposal that has been made
for what the personal/sub-personal distinction comes to has an
air of postulation (Block and Phillips 2016). Extreme views
abound. For example, according to a widely cited paper by
Charles Travis (2004), all perceptual representations are sub-
personal. People have intuitions about some cases but those in-
tuitions may concern reasonable postulations about how to use
a technical term.
By contrast, there is a robust border between conscious and
unconscious representations in some domains. As just ex-
plained, 50 cycles/degree is the border between consciously and
unconsciously seen gratings: representations in the visual sys-
tem of gratings that are more fine-grained than 50 cycles per de-
gree are unconscious. And alternating representations of color
above 10 Hz are unconscious. (No doubt there are borderline
cases and some variation from person to person.)
In short there is a fairly determinate border between con-
scious and unconscious, at least in some domains, but no one
has given a reason to believe in a determinate border between
personal and sub-personal, so there is no case that the two dis-
tinctions coincide. Anyone who claims that they do coincide
owes us a persuasive way of drawing a boundary between the
personal and sub-personal that does not beg the question
against unconscious perception.
I have tried to give sufficient conditions for the personal
level, conditions that I now regard more as useful postulations
than as objective facts about the distinction. In previous publi-
cations touching on the personal/sub-personal issue (Block
2016; Block and Phillips 2016), I have focused on three supposed
indicators of the personal level: whether the perceptual repre-
sentations guide the person’s action, whether they engage the
person’s preferences or needs, and whether they engage the
person’s understanding. I have no space to discuss all of them
but I will sketch how the first of them does classify some uncon-
scious perceptual representations as personal – and hence as
unconscious perception. The cases I have in mind involve the
dorsal visual system (Fig. 4).
Mel Goodale and David Milner have extensively tested a
brain damaged patient known as DF (or sometimes Dee) who
had damage to an area in the ventral visual cortex that under-
lies form perception (2008). DF could consciously see colors and
textures but not shapes or orientations. If shown a slot as in Fig.
5, she was consciously aware of a blob with no orientation and
she was nearly at chance in saying what the orientation of the
slot was and in matching a card to the direction of the slot as
shown on the left. However, and this is the indication of uncon-
scious perception of orientation, she could nonetheless post the
card through the slot with accuracy only slightly less than that
of normal subjects. The orientation was represented in her dor-
sal visual system but her conscious visual system represented
colors and textures. (The accuracy depictions in Fig. 5 are “nor-
malized”. That means that all slots are treated as if they were
vertical, and when the subject got the estimations and posting
wrong, that is graphed as a deviation from the vertical.)
How do we know that these perceptions are genuinely un-
conscious? Why else would DF be nearly at chance on matching
and saying what the orientation is?
Importantly, this paradigm does not require completely un-
conscious perceptual states. There is no need to shave off the
conscious part of a perception. In this paradigm, there are un-
conscious perceptual “contents” in otherwise conscious percep-
tions. DF consciously sees the stimulus but not the orientations
of the slot.
In the case of DF there is as definitive an answer to the
personal/sub-personal question as one is going to get for this
question: her unconscious visual representations are “her” rep-
resentations because they guide her actions in posting.
Volker Franz and Thomas Schenk have criticized some of
Goodale’s and Milner’s studies (Hesse et al. 2011). They argue
that DF may not visually represent orientations at all but rather
manage to post by a trial and error procedure, adjusting her
posting to avoid hitting the edge of the slot. Their evidence de-
rives from a study in which they gave normal subjects the task
of posting a card in a “slot” that was really a rectangle that was
much wider than the slot at the top of Fig. 5. The length of the
rectangle was shorter than the card so subjects could only fit
the card through by putting it on the diagonal. Their subjects
did do it in part by avoiding the edges. However, their slot was
designed to elicit obstacle avoidance and so does not reflect on
behavior involving a slot that is not so designed. Further as
Goodale and Milner note, “Dee moved her hand forward unhesi-
tatingly, and almost always inserted the card smoothly into the
slot. Moreover, video recordings revealed that she began to ro-
tate the card toward the correct orientation well in advance of
arriving at the slot.” (2005, 20) (I have seen some of this footage
and would concur for the footage I have seen.) Further, it would
seem that orientation perception would be required to avoid
hitting the edge of the slot with the card.
Figure 3. The point at which the bars merge is about 50 cycles per
degree of visual angle, which will differ depending on your distance
from this figure.
Note: Thanks to Marisa Carrasco for this image.
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Another experiment that combines conscious perception
with partially unconscious contents tested normal subjects on
gripping “Efron blocks”, blocks that differ in width though with
surface area and brightness held constant over the various
widths (Goodale and Murphy 1997). They affixed measuring de-
vices to the thumb and forefinger in order to measure grip preci-
sion at various angles from fixation of five of these blocks.
Subjects also had to say which of the five blocks they were see-
ing. If you hold out an object at a 70 angle from your line of
sight, you will see that you are very dimly conscious of its size:
you consciously can tell the difference only between a very large
and very small thing. What Goodale and Murphy found was
that grip precision did not differ much between 5 and 70, but
numerical judgments of the widths (the blocks were given num-
bers) had half the precision at 70 as at 5. This is not surprising
given that the conscious ventral visual system that dominates
foveal vision is much weaker than the action-guiding dorsal vi-
sual system in peripheral vision. The fact that the subjects’ grip
was much more precise in the periphery of vision than the sub-
jects’ size estimates strongly suggests that the guidance of grip
is not entirely conscious. In other words, unconscious represen-
tation of widths is partly guiding gripping. That unconscious
representation of width is – arguably – at the personal level be-
cause it guides action. Note that this argument for unconscious
perception requires no shaving off of the conscious part of
vision. What is unconscious is an aspect of the content of
perception.
To conclude: the debate about the existence of unconscious
perception has focused on whether the conscious part of a con-
scious perception can be shaved off, leaving only an uncon-
scious perception. Whatever the resolution of that issue is,
much if not all of conscious perception involves unconscious
perception.
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